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As popularly used, the term &dquo;governance&dquo; implies broad
general responsibility for an organization, its survival, and its well-being.
The process or act of governance is typically distinguished from that of
management or supervision. Governance involves both the setting of
organizational goals and the development of strategies for their achieve-
ment, using the traditional structure of a board of trustees, governors, or
directors, to which the top administrative officer of the organization usually
reports (Wisler ~986)..
Virtually all hospitals (by state articles of incorporation) are expected
to establish and maintain a board of trustees. Starkweather (1988) sug-
gests that hospital trustees traditionally have had eight functions to per-
form : they have been charged to (1) establish institutional goals and major
policies; (2) ensure that plans and programs are developed to meet cor-
porate goals; (3) provide for the long-range financial well-being of the
organization; (4) establish and maintain qualified and functioning med-
ical staff; (5) appoint and evaluate the chief executive officer; (6) review
and approve the overall organization of the hospital and the delegation
of authority therein; (7) ensure that the community is well informed
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concerning the organizations goals and performance; and (8) establish
and maintain good procedures for conducting the affairs of the board,
including the evaluation of its performance.
These functions, which derive from the &dquo;corporate&dquo; model of gov-
ernance, are usually viewed as the legislated or prescribed roles, rather
than the actual roles, performed by hospital boards. Indeed, Starkweather
sees these functions as being carried out in a rather passive fashion by
hospital boards. He notes that seven of the eight functions enumerated
are usually initiated by others in the organization and are simply pre-
sented to the board for ratification. Cast in these terms, the overriding
governance function in hospitals might be seen as stewardship, with
trustees serving as caretakers to protect and safeguard the assets of a
hospital (Shortell 1988).
Until recently, health care organizations could afford the luxury of
such passive stewardship, since governance functions were carried out in
the context of a positive, supportive environment. Trustees were serving
in a &dquo;time of plenty,&dquo; an era of cost-based reimbursement, when the
willingness of society to spend money for health care and to dedicate
resources to its maintenance and expansion seemed to be unlimited. Be-
ginning in the early 1980s, however, the environment of health care or-
ganizations began to change in significant ways. These changes were
characterized by increased concern about the continuing rise in the cost
of medical care, substantial alteration of the financial system,.shifts in the
political and legal environments of health care, and important demo-
graphic trends, including the rapid aging of the population.
These and other changes have led, in less than ten years, to a far
more uncertain and turbulent environment within which hospitals and
their boards must function. In response to these changes, hospitals them-
selves have adopted new strategies and organizational structures that
have placed governing boards at the vortex of change in their institutions.
It falls to governance, for example, to determine ways of allocating scarce
resources in the community interest, and even to define health care or-
ganizations as, in fact, community service organizations or as competitive
business entities instead. According to some, trustees will be increasingly
called on to provide strategic direction for the organization, to offer spe-
cific expertise; and to encourage risk taking (Barrett and Windham 1984;
Shortell 1988; Starkweather 1988).
This generally turbulent environment-and changes in legal defi-
nitions of board accountability in both the care quality and financial
management spheres of hospital operation, together with the general de-
mand for lower hospital costs-has produced a flurry of recent articles
in hospital journals concerning the performance of hospital boards and
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the extent to which certain board &dquo;models&dquo; can lead to better hospital
performance. Underlying much of this discussion is the assumption that
an optimum board structure can be defined, and that the closer a hospital
is to achieving that structure, the better its overall levels of performance
will be. Further, that &dquo;optimum&dquo; structure is always a departure from
traditional board structure, as generally defined, and rarely is it acknoivl-
edged that boards have changed over time as hospital organization, med-
ical technology, and hospital environments have changed.
In general, our current state of knowledge on governing board struc-
tures, processes, and influence is very incomplete. Relatively little solid
evidence exists to answer the questions: do governing boards make a
difference, and if so, in what way? The purpose of this article is to develop
a more comprehensive, dynamic model of governing boards within hos-
pitals and to suggest how board structures change over time. We argue
that before we can determine whether, and in what ways, governing
boards contribute to hospital performance, we need to know much more
about variation in board structure and about the relationships of such
variation to the different governance roles assumed by hospital boards.
Further, we need to examine the conditions under which different board
structures are likely to emerge and ways in which different board struc-
tures themselves might influence the types of profound structural changes
hospitals are currently experiencing.
In our exploration of these issues we first review briefly the history
of hospital governance as well as several different theoretical perspectives
on hospital governance and governing boards in general, including stud-
ies in health care management, on management and economic theories
of corporate boards, and on sociological theories of organizational gov-
ernance. From these diverse approaches we attempt to synthesize a core
set of board types and then to develop a theoretical model predicting the
influence of board types on various outcomes of importance to hospitals,
particularly organizational change variables.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF
HOSPITAL GOVERNANCE
It would be fairly easy to dismiss as ineffectual or powerless the
role of governance and governing boards in hospitals if one looked at the
shape and function of hospital boards only in the post-World War II era
and then further assumed that no changes of consequence concerning
hospital structures or their environments have occurred since then. Viewed
historically, however, such a static view of hospital governance is clearly
inadequate; the &dquo;ineffective&dquo; board picture has been valid only in specific
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periods of hospital and health care development. In fact, a cursory review
of the historical patterns of governance in the hospital sector reveals that
board roles and functions have changed as the role and function of the
hospital itself has changed. _
For example, in the mid- to late 1800s, hospitals were in a state of
transition from almshouses to institutions designed to care for the sick
and ailing. Needing capital and legitimacy, physicians were obliged to
seek out sponsors for these institutions from among the merchants, bank-
ers, lawyers, and political leaders of the local community. These sponsors
could contribute money and lead subscription campaigns to support hos-
pitals. From these needs resulted an organizational structure-in private
as well as public hospitals-in which boards of &dquo;managers,&dquo; trustees,
governors, or commissioners, rather than physicians or professional ad-
ministrators, retained final decision-making power (Barocci 1981). In ex-
change for sponsorship, hospitals conferred a variety of benefits and
powers on trustees. These included the familiar intrinsic rewards of per-
sonal satisfaction, fulfillment of religious obligations, or need to serve the
community, as well as more tangible expressions of control such as the
letting of contracts, patronage, appointments, and even the admission of
patients. As Starr (1982) has pointed out, in the early nineteenth century
the trustees entered directly into the detailed operations of hospitals,
including involvement in decisions that would now be seen as strictly
medical in nature. &dquo;
Changes in organization and hospital financing in the late nine-
teenth century, as well as rapid development in medical technology and
knowledge, gradually altered the distribution of power and authority in
hospitals. As the trustees’ sphere of control diminished, physicians’ con-
trol expanded. This devolution in lay trustee power occurred in large part
as a function of shifts in control over hospital resources or income. As
hospitals gradually obtained more income from patient receipts and less
from donations, trustee power and centrality was replaced by physician
influence. Further, expansion of the power of physician &dquo;expertise&dquo; as
medical care increased in complexity made trustee involvement in op-
erational and clinical decisions increasingly impractical (Perroiv 1963).
Physicians became important actors on hospital boards, as both policy-
makers and operational directors.
. In the mid-twentieth century yet another shift occurred in the role
and function of governance, as hospitals-experienced increasing com-
plexity in their internal organization as well as instability, turbulence,
and complexity in their relations with outside agencies such as regulators,
funders, and physician groups. Specifically, since the early 1980s, the
purchasers of hospital care, predominantly federal and state governments
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and business corporations, have become concerned with rapidly escalat-
ing health care costs and have demanded that costs be controlled and
unnecessary health care spending eliminated. Significantly, the nature of
the cost-control measures implemented has changed radically in the last
decade. Previously, cost containment had taken the form of regulatory or
voluntary cooperation, or both, among health care providers. By contrast,
the current environment provides a system of incentives that encourages
competition among providers.
This competition has intensified since the passage in 1983 of the
Medicare system of prospective payment through diagnosis-related groups
(PPS/DRG), a system designed to reimburse hospitals on the basis of
preset rates for specific procedures rather than on a cost-incurred basis.
As third party payers continue to restrict the amount of reimbursement
allowable for depreciation, return on investment, and selected medical
procedures, hospitals are being pressured to identify alternative sources
of funding, compete for increasingly limited resources, develop alternative
lines of business, and otherwise adapt to a rapidly changing health care
marketplace.
These adaptations have taken a variety of forms heretofore unknown
in the hospital industry. They range from relatively peripheral structural
alterations, such as joint venturing with physician groups and contracting
with payers, to more radical changes such as mergers, service reorien-
tations, acquisition by multihospital systems, corporate restructuring,
consolidations, and even closures. Some have argued that these structural
changes in hospitals contribute to domination by professional hospital
administrators and to the relegation of governance units to external-link-
age or boundary-spanning roles, with little or no internal control (Stark-
weather 1988). In fact, the role of governing boards in either precipitating
or preventing such radical reorganizations is poorly understood. Al-
though fundamental structural changes in organizations are influenced
by environmental forces, they rarely occur without approval or at least 
’
discussion by those with decision-making powers over the entire organ-
ization, that is, by the governing board.
Critical to this discussion is the notion that the power relations,
roles, and influence of hospital governance have varied as a result of the
changing technology and needs of hospitals; governance has changed its
function as the hospital has changed its function. This dynamic, flexible
role has been abetted by the incomplete integration of physicians, man-
agement, and governance in the hospital organization. Historically, each
group of actors has been only &dquo;loosely coupled&dquo; to the others, and to the
daily operation of hospital care. Each group has gained or lost centrality
depending on both external conditions and internal contingencies. As
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price-based competition, uncertainty, and demands for community ac-
countability increase, it is not surprising that the role and function . of
boards and their relationship with management and physicians is chang-
ing again. As Starr (1982) has argued, such changes are linked to the rise
of the corporate ethos in the medical care sector and by the concomitant
decline of professionalism and volunteerism as dominant cultures in the
hospital.
These changes are also linked to several recent legal precedents that
have reinforced the need for a &dquo;new model&dquo; of hospital governance. For
example, the case of Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital
(1965) and its folloiv-ons have clearly established that the hospital and its
board have direct responsibility for the quality of medical care practiced
within the institution. Although physicians previously were defined as
independent contractors and the hospital was not responsible for the neg-
ligent acts of its physicians, Darling changed the focus of legal respon-
sibility, making the hospital and its board responsible for monitoring and
assuring quality care. Further, other more recent cases (Schwinger v. U.S.
1987; Simpson v. U.S. 1987) have established similar fiduciary responsi-
bilities for hospitals and trustees. These cases have established the obli-
gation of governing boards to be diligent in performing the duties of
eleemosynary corporations. Thus, as legal definitions of organizational
accountability shift toward governing boards, the roles, power, and struc-
tures of boards regain center stage. - &dquo;




An extensive literature exists on hospital trusteeship and gover-
nance. However, the vast majority of these writings tend to be either
descriptive, focusing on general characteristics of hospital boards, or pre-
scriptive, delineating problems with board structure, process, or roles
and proposing solutions to those problems. This literature is contained,
for the most part, in hospital trade and practitioner journals, and is not
based on a solid foundation of theoretical and empirical research.
The American Hospital Association has grouped hospital gover-
nance literature into eight general categories, which include general
trusteeship (Abbot 1981; Cunningham 1985; Mott 1984; Jellison 1983),
governing board effectiveness (Bader and Associates 1983; Kovner 1985;
Ewell 1987; Wilson 1984), governing board evaluation (Moses 1986a,b;
Umbdenstock 1987; Huizenga and Anderson 1984), trustee-chief execu-
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tive officer relations (Ewell 1983; Doody and Fish 1980; Moses 1986a,b),
trustee-physician relations (Friedman 1982; Thompson 1979; Castele
1986-1987), trustee involvement in the community (Dawson 1982; Cohen
1986), liability issues related to trusteeship (Blaes 1982; Bernstein 1983),
and quality assurance (Jessee 1984; Williams and Donnelly 1982). By far,
the most widely discussed topic in the governance area concerns govern-
ing board effectiveness. These writings tend to be dominated by pre-
scriptive or normative recommendations for changes in governance
process, composition, and functions based on the &dquo;hands-on experience&dquo;
of either hospital managers or consultants, or both.
There is also a somewhat scant, although growing, literature on
board performance and effectiveness that is more empirically based. The
majority of these empirical studies have examined the relationship of
board composition, structure, and process to traditional hospital perfor-
mance-related outcomes such as efficiency and quality of care. Morlock
and her colleagues (1987) investigated the relationship of trustee influence
to quality of care. They proposed that when the chairperson of the board
is active and influential in community hospitals, patients experience lower
mortality rates. Although an empirical relationship was noted by the au-
thors, they acknowledged the difficulty of establishing a causal link be-
tween governance and hospital-related outcomes. I
Barrett and Windham (1984) attempted to assess the relationship
between particular board types and hospital effectiveness as mea’sured
by a series of financial indicators. They found that board effectiveness
depended not only on the congruency between the goals of the chief
executive officer (CEO) and the board chairman, but also on the relation-
ship between board type and the hospitals environment. Boards char-
acterized as &dquo;analyzer&dquo; and &dquo;prospector&dquo; boards, which actively engage
in environmental scanning and adjusting, were more effective in com-
petitive environments than were &dquo;defender&dquo; and &dquo;reactor&dquo; boards, which
tend to focus on internal efficiency.
Several earlier studies focused on the relationship between board
composition and hospital performance outcomes. One of the first (Shortell,
Becker, and Neuhauser 1976) assessed the relationship between manage-
ment involvement in board activity and support department costs. In
hospitals whose administrators were voting members of the board,
nonmedical support departments were found to have experienced lower
costs than in hospitals whose administrators were not voting members.
The same study found that the percentage of reports prepared and sent to
the board was more important in terms of lowering costs than was the total
number of reports prepared for the board. These results suggest a potential
link between board access to information and effective performance.
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The same authors focused more broadly on compositional issues
and board effectiveness in a later study (Kaufman, Shortell, Becker, et al.
1979). They found that the presence of physicians on the board was related
to a smaller percentage of board members from the financial and business
community; however, occupational variables did not seem to be corre-
lated with either cost or quality of care measures. Hospitals with admin-
istrative and physician representation on the board did not outperform
those with more traditionally composed boards.
Finally, in a study that considered a variety of internal organiza-
tional characteristics and their relationship to hospital costs, Sloan and
Vraciu (1983) found no association between characteristics of the hospital
board, such as size and composition, and hospital costs. Unlike a number
of previous investigations, this study employed several control variables
thought to be associated with hospital costs and potentially representative
of alternative explanations of the organization-cost relationship.
By and large, the hospital and health services literature on governing
boards and performance does not reach any consistent conclusions re-
garding the relationships between board characteristics and hospital ef-
fectiveness, even though this body of research provides a variety of data
about observed differences in types of boards. Indeed, in review, this
literature is undecided about defining the salient characteristics of hos-
pital boards and the relationships of these characteristics to aspects of
organizational effect ivenes s- and even about the aspects -of organiza-
tional effectiveness to consider in this context. Emphasis has primarily
been on testing bivariate relationships between specific attributes of
boards and operational indicators of hospital performance, without mod-
eling any generalized function of hospital boards. These studies are fur-
ther limited by very small sample sizes and inadequate methodologies
to control for alternative explanations of hospital effectiveness and
performance.
Perhaps most important, however, is the fact that a majority of these
studies have been insufficiently grounded in theory, which has led to an
unsystematic approach to governance research, particularly in the assess-
ment of governance effect on hospital performance. More theoretically
based research on hospital governance has focused on several specific
topics concerning either internal power relationships, the external roles
of governing boards, or change in board roles over time. We turn nozv
to a review of the literature on each topic.
HOSPITAL BOARD POWER AND AUTHORITY
As discussed earlier, in the past, hospital governing board authority
and responsibilities in internal decision making were not clearly defined.
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In some hospitals the board of trustees played an active role in policy and
program development, but in many other institutions the board per-
formed largely ceremonial functions and either delegated or abdicated
much authority for corporate decision making to the chief executive of-
ficer, the medical staff, or one or two very active board members (Morlock,
Nathanson, and Alexander 1987; Prybil 1980). This state of affairs is
reflected by a nearly complete omission of the topic of board power
and authority in the management and research literature on health care
organizations.
Economic models of hospitals, for example, typically viewed the
hospital organization as essentially a physicians’ cooperative (Pauly and
Redisch 1973). Others employed an exchange perspective in which the
only relevant actors were managers and medical staff (Jacobs 1974; Harris
1977). This perspective reflects the more general theory of managerial
hegemony, which defines a board as nothing more than an extension of
managements power over the organization resulting from managerial
control over the selection of outside directors (Williams 1979). As de-
scribed by Kosnik (1987), outside directors selected by management are
&dquo;expected to rubber-stamp managements policies&dquo; (p. 167). Unfortu-
nately, most comparative studies of hospital decision making have also
failed to examine the influence of trustees in relation to other groups
within the institution (Shortell 1974; Roemer and Friedman 1971; Morse,
Gordon, and Moch 1974; Shortell, Becker, and Neuhauser 1976; Scott,
Flood, and Ewy 1979).
Although seldom applied to studies of hospital boards, agency the-
ory (Fama 1980) provides an alternative perspective that combines issues
of board composition, effectiveness, and power/authority. Agency prob-
lems arise in corporate settings because the separation of ownership
(stockholders) and professional management (agents) leads to self-inter-
ested behavior on the part of the managers. A board’s internal monitoring
function supposedly serves as a possible monitoring mechanism to guard
against opportunistic management behavior. According to Kosnik (1987),
effective board monitoring depends on the boards identification with
stockholders’ interests, and board members’ expertise in decision making
(i.e., the exercise of authority rights). In the hospital sector, the issue of
ownership and control is increasingly complex, as corporate restructur-
ing, merger, and service unbundling can lead to a blurring of the profit/not-
for-profit distinction. To the extent that multiple &dquo;stakeholder&dquo; groups can
be identified, agency problems presumably translate into bargaining
among various interest groups vying for representation in the dominant
coalition (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).
In one of the few empirical studies related to board power and
authority, Kaluzny and Veney (1972) evaluated relative perceptions of
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influence in hospital decision making among boards, medical staff, and
management. Based on data collected from 49 general, acute care hospitals,
they found that board members’ perceptions of their own boards influ-
ence in six major decision areas was considerably lower than the percep-
tions of board influence held by either management or physicians. These
results further confirm the incongruities regarding board power and cast
doubt on the potential efficacy of board action in matters of internal
policy.
Contributing to the general ambiguity regarding the boards role
and function are two important paradoxes. Morlock, Nathanson, and
Alexander (1987) and Provan (1988) have noted that the hospital board’s
decision-making authority over internal functions is continually subject
to erosion by increased regulations, state budget review, health planning
agencies, and the requirements of external accrediting bodies (e.g., Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations). At the same
time, pressures from these groups, as well as an increase in court deci-
sions, have placed the hospital under increased public accountability and
have thereby forced governing boards to become more active in many
areas of decision making.
Provan (1988) points to a second paradox involving governing board
authority and decision making. He notes that external pressures for cost
containment under the prospective payment system together with de-
mands for higher-quality care have tended to exaggerate differences
between clinical and administrative orientations in hospitals. These dif-
ferences, Provan argues, lend themselves to an active interventionist or
compromising role for the board. Counterbalancing this trend, however,
is the increase in complexity of hospital organization structures as well
as the trend toward multicorporate systems and unbundling of hospital
services. These developments have led to greater decentralization of de-
cision making and a reduction of board influence over many internal
decisions.
Several empirical studies have provided evidence regarding ambi-
guity and confusion over board roles and authority in practice. A study
by Kovner (1974) showed that a gap existed between the areas considered
of highest priority by board members and the areas they considered them-
selves most qualified to handle. Areas of most concern were cost control,
quality of care, and relations with third party payers. The area of greatest
expertise for the majority of the board was capital investment. Ritvo
(1980) revealed similar findings on board process and function. His anal-
ysis of 121 Ohio hospitals indicated that boards seemed to spend their
time coping with the problems at hand rather than anticipating those of
the future. Ritvo found that boards relied heavily on internal data as
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opposed to external information to detect areas of concern. Not only ivas
environmental scanning being neglected, but the result of this overreli-
ance on internal data was an additional time delay in responding to ex-
ternal problems, depending on the length of time it took for external
problems to be recognized or captured, or both, on internal data. Ritvos
conclusion was that this sort of information-processing structure, which
focuses on internal affairs, results in a crisis-management, rather than
strategic-planning, approach to governance in hospitals (Ritvo 1980).
A more recent line of inquiry in the area of hospital governance has
attempted to step back from questions about the relationship of gover-
nance to hospital performance, to examine in more detail variation in
board structure and composition and in board influence over specific
policy-decision areas. In general, this research rests on the assumption
that board structure, composition, and influence will vary systematically
as a function of the characteristics of the organization itself, environmental
contingencies facing the organization, and whether or not the organiza-
tion is embedded in a larger corporate context. 
’
In a recent series of empirical studies on the topic of governance
authority and influence, Alexander and his colleagues examined the locus
of decision-making authority (hospital versus system level), as dependent
on the type of governance model used by the system (Morlock and Alex-
ander 1986); the type of decision being made (Alexander and Schroer
1985); and various system characteristics related to complexity, age, and
ownership (Alexander and Fennell 1986). These studies generally conclude
that the type of system affiliation and system structure were important
in understanding the nature and extent of governing board roles, influ-
ence, and autonomy.
A somewhat different line of research has focused on board relations
with hospital management and medical staff under varying organizational
conditions (Alexander and Morlock 1985; Morlock, Nathanson, and Alex-
ander 1987; Provan 1988). As a whole, these studies suggest that board
relations with internal and external stakeholders will vary as a function
of whether or not the hospital is part of a multihospital system, by own-
ership or control of the hospital, and by the hospital’s dependence on
particular patient populations and funding sources. Findings from these
studies support the general notion that hospital board structure, com-
position, and influence are not unidimensional. Rather, these character-
istics appear to vary systematically as a function of other important hospital
and environmental attributes. Hospital boards, therefore, do not play one
particular role in policy-making or external relations, but appear to adapt
their roles to local conditions and corporate context. Although empirical
evidence is lacking, one might also assume that such board roles and
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functions change over time as the contingencies facing hospitals change
and as different demands are placed on the policy-making and leadership
elements of the organization, especially demands and contingencies con-
cerning external roles of governing boards. We turn now to a consider-




The external roles and functions of hospital boards have received
somewhat more attention than the internal focus in both the health ser-
vices and sociological literature. Historically, the principal role of trustees
was to maintain or enhance the legitimacy and prestige of the hospital
and to attract resources to the institution from the surrounding environ-
ment (Kaufman, Shortell, Becker, et al. 1979; Kovner 1974; Pfeffer 1973).
Theoretically, the base from which- these external roles were derived can
be found in Thompsons (1967) classic model of organizations as sets of
nested levels. In brief, any organization can be conceptualized as a set of
three nested levels: the innermost level, the core technology, consists of
the production process or the core zvork of the organization; the second
level consists of the managerial level; and the outermost level, or insti-
tutional level, consists of key boundary-spanning units such as boards
and public relations units. As part of the institutional level, governing
boards function to link the organization to its environment, to set overall
policy and direction for the organization, and to buffer or protect more
internal levels of the organization (especially the core technology) from
uncertainties and disturbances posed by the environment.
More contemporary treatments of institutional-level phenomena in
organizations are represented by the work of Meyer and Rowan (1977),
and DiMaggio and Powell (1983); these were recently reviewed in Scott
(1987). Institutional theories of organizational behavior emphasize the
legitimacy-enhancing and prestige-lending functions of various organi-
zational structures. For example, in public-sector organizations one often
finds considerable dependence on certified professionals or elaborate in-
formation-processing systems, or an emphasis on cost accounting-none
of which may have any demonstrated effect on productivity or perfor-
mance, but all serving to signal other organizations and the public that
the organization in question is rational or &dquo;modem.&dquo; Organizational struc-
tures, then, can provide symbolic or ritualistic value, which enhances
survival chances.
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Starkweather (1988) argues that hospital governing boards are pri-
marily ritualistic structures used to enhance hospital legitimacy. The
&dquo;myth&dquo; of board authority is &dquo;an agreeable fiction ... contrived and
maintained by all three of the major hospital coalition groups&dquo;: top man-
agement, physicians, and lay trustees (p. 82), which allows management
to control physicians, physicians to continue to function within hospitals
as autonomous entrepreneurs, and lay trustees to maintain their personal
status and prestige. Further, the board structure itself allows hospital
structures to correspond more closely with the rest of corporate America,




Resource-dependence theory has also been used to study the roles
and structures of governing boards (Pfeffer 1973; Cook, Shortell, Conrad,
et al. 1983). Borrowing Thompson’s notion of boundary spanning as an
organizational strategy, resource dependence assumes that organizations
are not totally self-sufficient, and that all organizations need to engage in
transactions (i.e., build bridges) with other actors or organizations, or
both, in order to obtain resources needed for survival. Organizational
performance, then, is defined in terms of survival (particularly the suc-
cessful acquisition of needed resources) as well as the ability to maintain
organizational autonomy vis-i-vis various transaction partners.
Pfeffer (1973) was one of the earliest researchers to study board
effectiveness from a resource-dependence framework. Instead of using
traditional indicators of hospital performance, such as financial ratios,
mortality rates, and the like, Pfeffer viewed board effectiveness as the
ability to attract resources to the institution. In a study of 57 hospitals,
Pfeffer found that the size and composition of hospital governing boards
was related to the hospitals environment. Moreover, the ability of a hos-
pital to attract resources ivas a function of the fit between board size and
composition in the environmental context of a hospital. Pfeffer§ conclu-
sions pointed to defining board effectiveness in terms of environmental
linkage rather than operational measures of hospital performance.
The question of board composition has translated most recently into
a subsidiary issue concerning interorganizational linkage, that is, inter-
locking directorates. Studies of board interlocks have also focused pri-
marily on the corporate sector (Palmer 1983; Ornstein 1984; Mizruchi and
Koenig 1986). An interlock means that the same individual is sitting on
the boards of two organizations. As summarized by Mizruchi and Koenig
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(1986), an interlock can be conceptualized either as an interorganizational
phenomenon used by organizations to deal with uncertain environments
(as in resource dependence), or as an individual-level phenomenon, per-
haps &dquo;a mechanism employed by business elites to coordinate their class
interests&dquo; (Steams and Mizruchi 1986, 522). The question of whether
interlocks represent organizational or interpersonal linkages remains unan-
swered.
In the hospital sector it has become clear more recently that the
traditional external boundary-spanning role of governing boards (i.e., to
obtain needed resources) has been eroded both by the increasing com-
plexities of hospital financing and by the rapid escalation of regulatory
requirements (Maryland Hospital Education Institute 1979). Although both
the management and sociological literature continues to highlight the
boards so-called boundary-spanning function, emphasis is now placed
on linkage to either significant interest or stakeholder groups (i.e., con-
sumer groups and regulatory agencies such as state rate-setting or review
commission) or as linkages to important elements in the institutional
environment (Maryland Hospital Education Institute 1979; Umbdenstock
1979; Fennell and Alexander 1987; Morlock, Nathanson, and Alexander
1987).
Given the strategic importance of governing boards within the in-
stitutional level, both in institutional and resource-dependence theories,
board influence in processes of organizational change has been surpris-
ingly neglected in empirical research. The dual functions of boards as
internal control systems and external monitoring units represents a unique
focus point for both internal and external influences on organizational
change. Depending on both environmental conditions and stage in the
organization!5 development, we might expect boards to emphasize var-
ious roles differentially, as either change buffers or change catalysts. As
discussed earlier, hospital adaptations to an increasingly turbulent en-
vironment have resulted in an escalation in the frequency and variety of
a number of radical organizational changes. Yet our knowledge of the
extent to which hospital boards influence decisions to transform hospital
structure is extremely limited. The next section examines issues of or-
ganizational change, both developmental and crisis oriented, and board
function.
ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
CHANGE, AND THE ROLE OF , 1
GOVERNING BOARDS
The critical integration of board role and function and fundamental
or profound organizational change was discussed two decades ago by
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Zald (1969) in his seminal work on the theory of boards. Zald argued
that; over long periods of time, an examination of board functions would
reveal an &dquo;ebb and flow of board activity, importance and power during
different phases of the organization’s development&dquo; (p. 109). Of particular
interest are what Zald called &dquo;broad phase problems.&dquo; It is during these
phase problems that organizational boards are most likely to assert them-
selves either through board ratification and approval of managerial action,
or crystallization of dissent among board members with respect to man-
agerial policy. Similarly, Mizruchi (1983) argues that board power is most
likely to be asserted during the handling of major problems or strategic
decision points. In a related vein, Kosnik (1987) has argued that the effect
of boards on organizational performance and change is likely to be con-
fined to particular incidents in which the board actively intervenes in the
organizations strategic decision making in order to prevent management
from making decisions in conflict with stakeholders’ interests. Thus, Kos-
nik maintains that accurate insights into the relationship of board gov-
ernance and organizational change would only result from studies of
situations where the board is potentially faced with &dquo;acute governance
problems and choices&dquo; (p. 164). Indeed, the boardroom is the one place
where different external influences of the organization meet regularly to
discuss and essentially to control decisions and actions of the organization.
Of the three types of broad-phase problems Zald discusses, the
most telling are life-cycle problems, particularly problems of (1) organi-
zational genesis, (2) character formation and transformation, and (3) basic
identity crisis. Organizational genesis describes the situation in which a
new corporation is organized or established. In such cases, the attention
is paid to formulation of policy, rules for managers and boards, and for-
mulation of guidelines for action. To deal with decisions regarding organ-
izational genesis, boards meet regularly and often, and board power and
influence are continually used and called on (Zald 1969).
The second type of life-cycle problem concerns character crises/
transformation. This problem relates to changes in the institutional mech-
anisms of the organization for handling problems (recurring and basic),
and conflict within the organization and with its environment. In stable
environments these mechanisms provide an organization with standard-
ized ways of coping with issues such as labor policy problems, product
emphasis, market strategies, and relations with competitors. Changes in
these institutionalized aspects of organizational character become board
issues. Mechanisms through which boards become involved in character
crisesltransformation include legal requirements for boards in policy set-
ting and conflict arbitration resulting from changing traditional or estab-
lished operating patterns.
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The final category of life-cycle problems is identity crisis. These are
situations in which the existence of the organization as an organization
is threatened. In practice, such threats may take the form of merger, clo-
sure, or joint undertakings with other organizations that partially restrict
the autonomy and independence of the organization. Under these circum-
stances the board will be called on to determine the type or direction, or
both, of a policy that threatens to affect the identity of the organization.
More recently, theoretical development and research on organiza-
tional life cycles has moved beyond a heavy reliance on developmental
notions of birth, growth, maturation, and decline, to a simpler and more
comprehensive definition of stages as &dquo;clusters of subsystem problems or
issues&dquo; (Whetten 1987, 338). Organizational life-cycle stages are not nec-
essarily &dquo;progressive&dquo; and sequential; organizations can and do pass into
and out of different stages and reenter earlier stages. The broad-phase
problems identified by Zald can occur in various sequences and repeat-
edly over time. Similarly, major reorganizations are not necessarily &dquo;ev-
olutionary&dquo; or developmental in nature. Transition paths through various
changes over time may be nonrecursive, and multiple changes over time
could be interdependent.
Four primary clusters of life-cycle stages can be defined from the
literature: growth, decline, stability, and instability (Cameron, Kim, and
Whetten 1987). Growth and decline are often conceptualized as those sets
of conditions in which a substantial increase or decrease in.an organi-
zations resource base occurs over a specified period of time. Instability
has been empirically defined by Cameron and coworkers as nontrivial,
rapid, discontinuous, or fluctuating change in an organization’s resource
base; stability is defined as either the absence of change or a trivial
amount of change.
In addition to these fairly lengthy stages or phases of organizational
growth or decline, hospitals are currently at risk of experiencing a variety
of fundamental or profound organizational changes of a more instanta-
neous or abrupt nature as they attempt to deal with the major environ-
mental shifts occurring in the hospital sector. Such profound organizational
change can be conceptualized in terms of Hannan and Freemans (1984)
and Pfeffer’s (1982) notion of change in core attributes of the organization.
Criteria for defining such changes include: (1) changes in the stated goals
of the organization; (2) changes in the forms of authority within the
organization; (3) changes in core technology; (4) changes in the kinds of
clients or customers to which the organization orients its production, or
in the ways it attracts resources from the environment; and (5) changes
in the fundamental identity or autonomy of the organization as they per-
tain to loss of organizational culture or power to control organizational
destiny, or both.
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TABLE 1 Profound Organizational Changes (POC) in Hospitals
The hospital sector has been subject recently to at least five major
types of structural change: corporate restructuring, multifirm system af-
filiation, merger, major service change, and closure. All of these changes
have a profound effect on organizational autonomy; except for closure,
however, these changes do not necessarily result in organizational failure.
Further, several different types of mergers and affiliations can be defined.
Mergers can take one of three different forms: in a combination of or-
ganizations A and B, the remaining organization can be identified as
either a third party, C, or one of the original units, A or B. Similarly, two
types of system affiliation can be distinguished: situations in which an
organization is purchased by a system, or in which two or more inde-
pendent organizations combine to form a system.
Table 1 summarizes all eight types of profound organizational changes
experienced recently by hospitals. From the point of view of Hospital A,
two changes can be considered growth or diversification strategies, main-
taining inherent organizational identity and autonomy and thus consid-
ered positive changes (+); four changes represent a loss of autonomy
(-); and two changes result in the formation of a different organizational
structure, either through the creation of a new firm or a multifirm system
(?). In these situations the outcomes of profound organizational change
with respect to autonomy are not clear; the boards decision to pursue or
not to pursue these two types of changes would be fraught with consid-
erably more informational uncertainty than in the previously described
cases.
As mentioned previously, the role of governing boards in either
pursuing or blocking such profound changes is poorly understood. We
suggest that to answer the question &dquo;Do boards make a difference?&dquo; re-
quires an analysis of governing board influence on these crucial decisions.
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As we have seen in our review of various literatures on board role and
functions, governing boards play different roles under different sets of
conditions, and board structures vary across hospitals. It is quite likely
that particular board structures may be more or less likely to influence
decisions to profoundly change a hospital’s structure. We would also sug-
gest, following Zald (1969), that the hospitals life-cycle stage should be
included as an important contextual variable that may change the rela-
tionship between board structure and the likelihood of decisions to merge,
restructure, or otherwise radically change a hospitals structure.
In the next section we present two basic models of board structure
and hypothesize how these board models may influence decisions to pur-
sue or block various profound organizational changes.
A SYNTHESIS OF PREVIOUS
RESEARCH AND THEORY
ON BOARD STRUCTURE
As an aid in synthesizing this lengthy review of governance and
governing board structures, we turn to two conceptual models recently
developed by Alexander, Morlock, and Gifford (1988) for predicting dif-
ferences between governance in restructured and nonrestructured hos-
pitals : philanthropic and corporate board models. The philanthropic model,
similar to Mintzberg’s &dquo;board service role&dquo; (Mintzberg 1983), is based on
descriptions of boards of nonprofit organizations, while the corporate
model is derived from descriptions of boards of directors in the private
sector (Johnson 1986). Although the philanthropic model shares some of
the symbolic functions stressed by Starkweather (1988), its role is more
often to be actively engaged in traditional boundary-spanning activities.
The corporate model, by contrast, is generally more strategically oriented.
Eight key characteristics of these two board types are presented in
Table 2 and discussed here (based on Alexander et al. 1988). Each char-
acteristic is assumed to vary on a continuum from the philanthropic to
the corporate structure. Although these eight dimensions are important .
and representative characteristics of the two board models, they are not
necessarily exhaustive of all factors that may distinguish between the
two.
1. Board Size. Philanthropic boards are characterized by a large
number of members owing to the voluntaristic nature of their
activity and the broad range of interests they represent (Pfeffer
1973). Historically, the major role of hospital trustees has been
to maintain or enhance the legitimacy and prestige of the insti-
175
TABLE 2 Governing Board Types
__ ~ _ ~_ _ _ ~ ~ ~ _ ~ ~
Source: Alexander, J. A., L. Morlock, and B. D. Gifford. &dquo;The Effects of Corporate
Restructuring on Hospital Policymaking.&dquo; Nealfli Services Research 23, no. 2 (1988):
311-38.
tution within the community as well as to attract resources to the
hospital from the surrounding environment. Corporate boards,
in contrast, tend to be smaller and more focused as a function of
the narrower constituencies to which the organization is account-
able (Zald 1969; Ewell 1987).
2. Heterogeneity. For similar reasons, the range of perspectives and
backgrounds on philanthropic boards tends to be much broader
than that of their corporate counterparts (Pfeffer 1973). This is
due to the influence of a wide range of constituencies and stake-
holders in philanthropic organizations in contrast to the narrower
shareholder representation role assumed by most corporate boards
(Johnson 1986). For these reasons, philanthropic boards are more
likely than corporate boards to have members with diverse char-
acteristics of age, gender, racial or ethnic background, area of
residence, and occupation. The more &dquo;business-like&dquo; orientation
of corporate boards is particularly likely to be reflected in greater
occupational homogeneity.
3. liiside Directors. Inside directors are those board members who
also have operational roles in the organization. Corporate boards
contain a larger number of inside directors to enable outside
directors to take advantage of the insiders’ knowledge of the
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business, to confer prestige as a form of reward to a manager,
and to achieve greater correspondence between organizational
operations and policy-making (Mace 1971). Philanthropic boards,
because of their emphasis on environmental linkages and com-
munity relations, typically contain fewer inside directors (Mor-
lock and Alexander 1986).
4. CEO Participatioll Oil Board. In a corporate model board, chief
executive officers in the organization play a more important role
in board affairs than their counterparts on philanthropic boards.
This results because the CEO of a philanthropic organization
typically shares power with other professional and management
groups, thus diluting his or her influence with the board (Alex-
ander and Morlock 1985; Zuckerman, Barrett, and Shortell 1979).
The corporate CEO has traditionally held more power vis-A-vis
the board and the organization because of his or her ultimate
authority over all aspects of the organization’s operations (Mizru-
. chi 1983). Strong executive influence on the board is viewed as
improving the linkage between policy-making and operations,
lessening conflict between management and board members, and
facilitating selection of directors whose views are consistent with
the philosophy of the organization (Johnson 1986).
5. CEO Accoittitability to Board. Management involvement on the
board, however, is a double-edged sword. The corporate-model
board, in contrast to the philanthropic board,. tends to distin-
guish more sharply between policy-making and operations of
the organization. It is more likely to see its own role as that of
formulating institutional policy and strategic decision making,
with delegations of responsibility and authority to the CEO for
day-to-day operations. This distancing of the board from oper-
ational decisions increases the need for mechanisms that enable
the board to monitor and assess CEO activities and hospital per-
formance. Routine, formal CEO evaluations by the board are seen
as an important method of monitoring and improving CEO per-
formance, as well as a way of indirectly establishing stronger
linkages between operations and policy-making (Alexander and
Morlock 1985).
6. Limit to Consecutive Terms. Philanthropic boards, in contrast to
corporate boards, tend to be self-perpetuating bodies wherein
members of the board may either select their successors or serve
on the board indefinitely (Ewell 1982). Corporate boards tend
to put limitations on the number of consecutive terms board
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members may serve, to keep the board from becoming too
conservative and stale (Pfeffer 1973; Kovner 1978).
7. Board Compensation. Corporate boards are also more likely than
philanthropic boards to compensate their members for board ser-
vice (Ewell 1982). Although corporate board members are only
rarely fully compensated for the value of their time, it is felt that
even a token gesture in this regard strengthens the bond behveen
the board member and the organization. Philanthropic boards,
by contrast, have traditionally avoided compensating board
members because of the voluntary nature of board service (John-
’ 
son 1986).
8. Strategic Activity. In terms of board activity, philanthropic board
members are likely to view themselves as trustees concerned with
preserving the assets of the organization and fulfilling fiduciary
responsibilities. Corporate board members are more likely to em-
phasize their role also in establishing overall policy direction
(Prybil and Starkweather 1976; Ritvo 1980). In the current health
care climate, for example, they are more likely to be concerned
with the hospitals competitive position; proposals for diversifi-
cation, mergers, and joint ventures; and strategic planning.
In general, these two board models hold different implications for
the timing and type of profound organizational changes that are likely to
occur in hospitals. Given the characteristics of corporate board structures,
we would hypothesize that hospitals with a corporate-style board are
more likely to pursue profound changes of an autonomy-enhancing or
diversification mode (&dquo;+&dquo; changes in Table 1). Philanthropic-style boards,
however, are more cumbersome, more risk averse, and more concerned
with &dquo;asset preservation.&dquo; Hospitals with philanthropic-style boards, then,
would be more likely to experience profound changes involving auton-
omy loss (&dquo;-&dquo; changes in Table 1), or alternatively, to avoid all types of
profound changes. However, these basic arguments linking board type
and organizational change are likely to be mediated by, or conditional on
whether the hospital is in a period of growth, decline, stability, or
instability.
PROPOSED MODEL OF GOVERNANCE
IN HOSPITALS AND PROFOUND
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
The model we propose of governance and profound organizational
change (POC) in hospitals is summarized in Figure 1. This schematic
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FIGURE 1 Hypotheses
summarizes our three major sets of hypotheses: (1) the basic relationships
between type of board structure and types of hospital changes expected,
(2) the conditioning effects of life-cycle stage on those basic relationships, .
and (3) the effects of certain types of profound changes on changes in
governing board structure. 
’
To summarize; we argue that specific structural and compositional
features of hospital boards will have a significant influence on the
likelihood that a hospital will engage in or resist various profound
organizational changes. Further, the relationship of board structure and
composition to profound organizational change will be mediated by the
life-cycle stage of the hospital, that is, by whether the hospital is in a
period of growth, decline, stability, or instability. These relationships are
expected to hold, controlling for other structural and environmental vari-
ables (organization size, location, market structure). Finally, we argue that
profound organizational change will itself result, in certain cases, in
structural and compositional changes in the hospital board as the new or
radically changed organization seeks legitimacy and support in its
environment.
In general, we expect corporate boards to be more effective in de-
veloping strategic policy direction for the hospital, to be more responsive
and adaptive to rapid environmental change, and to be less risk averse
than their philanthropic counterparts. These characteristics would result
in a higher probability of corporate-model boards influencing positive
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POCs, such as growth-related mergers and corporate restructuring. Phil-
anthropic boards, on the other hand, tend to serve a representation func-
tion, linking the hospital to the community and to critical resources in
the environment. Concomitantly, philanthropic boards tend to act as an
interface between the organization and its environment and, as such, to
serve as a buffer for the organization against hostile environmental forces.
Because of its cumbersome size and composition, we anticipate that
philanthropic boards will be less responsive to environmental stressors
and less able to develop strategies that will result in positive organiza-
tional change for the hospital. In other words, philanthropic boards are
more likely to be &dquo;overcome by events&dquo; and forced into accepting negative
profound organizational change when environmental circumstances
dictate.
Alternatively, philanthropic boards are thought to be highly effective
in terms of buffering organizations from their environments. This attrib-
ute, coupled with the fact that these types of boards tend to be status-
quo oriented, suggest that philanthropic boards are also more likely to
be associated with the lack of profound organizational changes of any
type. We hypothesize:
Hl: In general, hospitals governed by corporate boards are more
likely to experience positive profound organizational change
than are hospitals governed by philanthropic boards.
H2: In general, hospitals governed by philanthropic boards are more
likely to experience negative profound organizational change,
as well as no profound change, than are hospitals governed by
corporate boards.
As discussed earlier, however, we expect these relationships to differ
depending on the life-cycle stage experienced by the hospital. Although
Hl should hold under conditions of either growth or stability, experience
of a stage of decline in the hospital means that the relationship between
corporate-board structure and the likelihood of positive POCs will weaken
(indicated by a dashed arrow in Figure 1). Even though we expect cor-
porate-board hospitals to be less risk averse than their philanthropic
counterparts, the probability of risk taking and profound change will fall
off under conditions of steady decline, as the organization attempts to
minimize losses and regroup. Further, if the hospital is in a stage of
unstable or variable growth, we would expect hospitals with corporate
boards to be more likely to attempt more uncertain strategies, such as
system formation or mergers in which two organizations combine to form
a third entity (Type III mergers; see Table 1). The autonomy of the
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organization may be jeopardized in these uncertain changes, but the
ultimate reward could be great. Thus, the following corollaries are offered
under HI:
Hla: Under conditions of organizational decline, hospitals with cor-
porate-style boards are less likely to experience a positive POC
than they are under conditions of growth or stability.
Hlb: Under conditions of organizational instability, hospitals with
corporate-style boards are more likely to experience uncertain
POCs than they are under conditions of growth, stability, or
decline.
Life-cycle stage will also change the likelihood of profound organ-
izational change within hospitals with philanthropic-style boards. How-
ever, for these types of hospitals the moderating effect of life-cycle stage
functions to delineate the conditions under which either negative changes
or no change is more likely to occur. As we suggested earlier, philan-
thropic-style boards either can function to buffer the organization from
its environment, and thus preserve the status quo, or they can become
cumbersome and nonadaptive in structure, thus allowing the organiza-
tion to become engulfed by external forces. We hypothesize that life-cycle
stage represents the key to determining the role that becomes dominant
for philanthropic-style boards. When the organization is growing,.or when
it is relatively stable, philanthropic boards are more likely to act as effec-
tive buffers, in which case no fundamental changes are likely to occur.
However, if the organization is already experiencing a downturn, the
strategic incapacity of this type of board is likely to increase the proba-
bility of negative profound changes, such as purchase by a multihospital
system, merger with another organization, a complete service change, or
closure.
Thus, we present the following corollaries to H2:
H2a: Under conditions of organizational decline, hospitals with
philanthropic-style boards are more likely to experience neg-
ative profound organizational changes than they are under
conditions of growth, stability, or instability.
H2b: Under conditions of organizational growth or stability, hos-
pitals with philanthropic-style boards are more likely to ex-
perience no profound organizational change than they are
under conditions of instability or decline.
In the above hypotheses we have treated board structure as the
major independent variable. However, we anticipate that, under certain
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circumstances, boards will adapt and change in response to major or-
ganizational reconfiguration and environmental shifts. Specifically, we
anticipate that, subsequent to profound organizational changes that result
in a new organizational entity (e.g., mergers, system formation, corporate
restructuring), organizations will strive to enhance external legitimacy in
their environments by altering the composition or structure, or both, of
their boards (Pfeffer 1973; Alexander and Fennell 1986; Fennell and Alex-
ander 1987; Starkweather 1988). We anticipate that, for hospitals experi-
encing changes that result in the formation of a new organizational entity,
boards will increase in size and outside representation in order to estab-
lish environmental linkages and increase organizational legitimacy in the
broader environment. Conversely, in those situations where profound
organizational change in hospitals does not result in a new organizational
entity, less pressure will exist either to establish new linkages to envi-
ronmental resources or to enhance legitimacy, or both. Based on the
above, we hypothesize:
H3: Hospitals that have experienced profound organizational change
resulting in the formation of a new organizational entity will
increase the number of board members and representation by
outside directors on the hospital governing board.
H4: Hospitals that have experienced profound organizational change
that does not result in the formation of a new organizational
entity will experience no changes in board size or composition.
SUMMARY AND
CONCLUSIONS
Over the past decade the importance of governing boards as policy-
setting and oversight units within organizations has increased dra-
matically. Although this is true for both corporate- and private-sector
organizations (Bacon and Brown 1977; Gelman 1988), it is particularly
relevant to the health sector. Hospital governing boards, long considered
inconsequential in hospital management, have recently become subject to
closer scrutiny. The role of governing boards in decisions affecting hospital
strategy and hospital performance is once again a topic of some interest in
boardrooms and hospital trade journals.
Impressive evidence of the renewed interest in governance is pro-
vided by the funding of an instructional consortium by the W. K. Kellogg
Foundation to help strengthen trusteeship and governing board decision
making, and to improve education for health services managers in the
area of governance. Members of the consortium include the Hospital
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Research and Educational Trust, the American Hospital Association, the
American College of Healthcare Executives, and the Association for
University Programs in Health Administration. Among the activities being
undertaken by this consortium is the development of a self-assessment
toollmethodology for boards, a bibliography and reference guide on ef-
fective governance for practicing trustees, research workshops for faculty
in health administration programs, and a teaching guide on governance
and trustee leadership.
Despite this interest, the question with which we began this article
persists. Do governing boards make a difference? In the course of our
review of previous work on governance we found that, more often than
not, that question has been transformed into: how do boards influence
hospital performance? And very often that question has been further
narrowed into: which board structure leads to better hospital performance?
We have argued for a respecification of the initial question. Rather
than pursuing a definition of the maximally performing governing board,
we should perhaps shift our focus back to a fuller understanding of board
structure and function, and its influence on hospital change. The model
developed here combines four essential, and very basic, questions:
1. What are the basic dimensions that underlie structural variation
in different types of governing boards? ./’
2. How do these board types influence structural change in hospitals?
3. How is the effect of board influence on change itself likely to
. 
change over time as a function of the hospitals ’general pattern
of growth, decline, stability, or instability? And finally,
4. How does profound change in hospital structure influence, in
turn, the structure of governing boards as the new or radically
changed hospital seeks legitimacy and support from its envi-
ronment ?
Of course, this respecification of the study of hospital governing
boards requires that research on boards reflect a number of methodolog-
ical concerns, not the least of which is a longitudinal focus. In order to
evaluate both the influence of different board models on decisions to
change hospitals profoundly and the effect of hospital change on govern-
ing board size and composition, we would need comparative data on a
large number of hospitals for a reasonable period of time. Both the sample
size and the time frame must be large enough to allow for both a com-
parison of hospitals in different life-cycle stages and the modeling of the
antecedents of a variety of different profound changes.
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We contend that such an approach would provide a much more
dynamic picture of hospital governance than has been seen, in that the
interplay of board structure, hospital structure, and larger hospital con-
text would become much clearer than before. Hospital boards take many
different roles and change structures under different sets of conditions.
Given the rapidity of change in the current hospital environment, an
examination of the dynamics of board structure influence on organiza-
tional change, and of ways in which the structures themselves change
over time, would contribute greatly to our understanding of larger, sys-
temwide changes in health care.
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